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I. INTRODUCTION 
Frequent fliers in the criminal justice context are a “very active 
group of minor offenders who cycle through local correctional 
institutions on a regular basis.”1  Police and prosecutors use the term 
generically, often referring to a defendant with many prior arrests as a 
“frequent flier.”2  Frequent fliers are, presumably, familiar with 
interrogation procedures employed by the police and are less likely to be 
coerced by the hostile and intimidating environments of a custodial 
interrogation.  In particular, because they are familiar with police 
                                                                                                             
 1 Marilyn Chandler Ford, Frequent Fliers: The High Demand User in Local 
Corrections, 3 CALIFORNIAN J. HEALTH PROMOTION 61, 61 (2005) (“These persons, whom 
practitioners have labeled frequent fliers, are characterized by their high-volume of jail 
admissions and discharges.  In most cases, these offenders have dozens of arrests and jail 
admissions—but some high-demand users have been admitted more than a hundred 
times.”).  See also Frequent Flier Definition, DOUBLETONGUED.ORG, http:// 
www.doubletongued.org/index.php/dictionary/frequent_flier (defining frequent flier as “a 
repeat offender; a recidivist; (generally) a person who regularly or habitually uses or 
takes advantage of a service”).  The Pierce County, Washington, Criminal Justice Task 
Force formed a work group to deal with the issue of “frequent fliers,” defined as “chronic 
minor offenders who are heavy users of county and private sector resources.”  Criminal 
Justice Task Force Work Groups, PIERCE COUNTY WASH. (Nov. 3, 2008), 
http://www.co.pierce.wa.us/xml/abtus/plans/perf-audit/CJTF_Work_Groups-Nov4-
revised.pdf. 
 2 For example, a captain of the Massillon Police Department referred to a suspect 
(named Donald Duck) with “multiple previous DUIs, multiple previous no operator’s 
license and operating under suspension,” as a frequent flier.  Ben Muessig, Cops Accuse 
Donald Duck of Driving Drunk, AOL NEWS (June 29, 2010, 11:56 AM), 
http://www.aolnews.com/weird-news/article/cops-accuse-donald-duck-of-driving-drunk/ 
19535273 (internal citations omitted).  See also KIDCOP, Cop Talk Forum, OFFICER.COM 
(Oct. 5, 2001, 12:05 AM, http://forums.officer.com/forums/archive/index.php/t-
16243.html (defining  “frequent flier” as “someone who goes to jail allot/often [sic]”); 
and From Halfway House Back To The Big House: “Frequent Flier” (Repeat Offender) 
Returns to Prison, LEXINGTONPROSECUTOR.COM (Mar. 5, 2010), 
http://www.lexingtonprosecutor.com/?p=2922#more-2922 (prosecutor news release 
states that “frequent flier” with six convictions was returned to prison). 
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procedure and tactics, the psychological effects of police interrogation 
tactics—which are the result of isolating suspects and cutting them off 
from the outside world—have a less significant effect on frequent fliers.3  
The original purpose underlying the Court’s decision in Miranda v. 
Arizona,4 thus, was to reduce the likelihood that suspects would fall 
victim to constitutionally impermissible practices of police interrogation 
in an intimidating atmosphere.5  Miranda was intended to limit what was 
thought to be the inherently coercive atmosphere of custodial 
interrogations.6  In Miranda, the Court established a set of “procedural 
safeguards that require police to advise criminal suspects of their rights 
under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments before commencing 
custodial interrogation.”7 
Between May 2009 and the end of the October 2009 term, the 
Supreme Court decided four cases interpreting Miranda that featured 
frequent fliers: Montejo v. Louisiana,8 Florida v. Powell,9 Maryland v. 
Shatzer,10 and Berghuis v. Thompkins.11  In all four cases, the suspects 
were presumably familiar with the Miranda warnings, were aware that 
the police would honor the Miranda warnings, were familiar with police 
tactics, and, as a result, were less likely to be intimidated by the isolation 
                                                                                                             
 3 Contra Russell L. Weaver, Reliability, Justice and Confessions: The Essential 
Paradox, 85 CHI.-KENT L. REV.179 (2010) (stating that confessions may be unreliable 
because “suspects may be surrounded by the police, isolated in an interrogation room, cut 
off from the outside world, and not fully aware of their rights or the legal system.  When 
a suspect is scared, the suspect may be more likely to make incriminating statements by 
mistake.”). 
 4 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
 5 Id. 
 6 Id. at 444–45.  See also Mark Godsey, Miranda’s Final Frontier—The 
International Arena: A Critical Analysis of United States v. Bin Laden, and a Proposal 
for a New Miranda Exception Abroad, 51 DUKE L.J. 1703, 1758 (2002) (“The Miranda 
warnings were designed to counteract the inherently coercive atmosphere of custodial 
interrogation.  By advising a suspect of his rights, the police alleviate some of the 
compulsion associated with custodial questioning and provide an atmosphere in which a 
suspect could knowingly and freely invoke those rights if he so desires.”); Harvey Gee, 
An Ambiguous Request for Counsel Before, and Not After a Miranda Waiver: United 
States v. Rodriguez, United States v. Fry and State v. Blackburn, 5 CRIM. L. BRIEF 51, 52 
(2009) (“[T]he Miranda Court was concerned with the inherently coercive atmosphere of 
custodial interrogations.”); Conor G. Bateman, Note, Dickerson v. United States: 
Miranda Is Deemed a Constitutional Rule, but Does It Really Matter?, 55 ARK. L. REV. 
177, 201 (2002) (“The ‘protective devices’ that the Miranda Court thought necessary to 
dispel the inherently coercive atmosphere of custodial interrogation are now collectively 
known as the ‘Miranda warnings.’”). 
 7 Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195, 201 (1989). 
 8 129 S. Ct. 2079 (2009). 
 9 130 S. Ct. 1195 (2010). 
 10 130 S. Ct. 1213 (2010). 
 11 130 S. Ct. 2250 (2010). 
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of custodial interrogation.  In deciding these four cases, the Court could 
infer that the suspects were less likely to make a coerced confession as a 
result of the psychological effects of police interrogation techniques.  In 
other words, while the original Miranda decision held that the 
atmosphere of a custodial interrogation generates “inherently compelling 
pressures which work to undermine the individual’s will to resist and to 
compel him to speak where he would not otherwise do so freely,” these 
later decisions shift the focus from the atmosphere to whether the 
individual suspects were actually compelled to make incriminating 
statements.12  As a result, the Court was able to continue a process of 
limiting the scope of the original Miranda decision by focusing more 
responsibility on the subjective knowledge of suspects rather than the 
actions of law enforcement. 
Montejo, Powell, Shatzer, and Thompkins all begin with the 
generally uncontested premise that the rights described in Miranda may 
be waived.13  While the validity of a waiver is assessed based on the 
totality of the circumstances, the Supreme Court has yet to elaborate a set 
of factors for courts to consider in determining whether a suspect’s 
waiver was voluntary.  In particular, the Court has not explicitly 
considered a suspect’s criminal history and familiarity with the criminal 
justice system in determining whether a waiver was voluntary.  However, 
lower federal and state courts interpreting the voluntariness of a 
confession have explicitly included a suspect’s criminal background 
among the factors to be considered in determining voluntariness.14 
This Article examines the Supreme Court and lower courts’ 
increased consideration of the criminal background of suspects, whether 
implicit or explicit, in determining whether a Miranda waiver is made in 
a knowing, intelligent and voluntary manner.  Part I of this Article 
reviews existing Miranda doctrine and the factors considered by the 
Supreme Court in determining whether a waiver of Miranda rights is 
knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.  Part II reviews the four Miranda 
cases recently decided by the Supreme Court.  Part III examines the 
common theme of experienced defendants in the four cases, and 
proceeds to review the manner in which lower courts have taken the 
criminal background of suspects into account in determining whether a 
                                                                                                             
 12 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966). 
 13 See, e.g., Montejo, 129 S. Ct. at 2085 (“Our precedents also place beyond doubt 
that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel may be waived by a defendant, so long as 
relinquishment of the right is voluntary, knowing, and intelligent.”) (citing Patterson v. 
Illinois, 487 U.S. 285, 292, n.4 (1988); Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 404 (1977); 
Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938)).  See also Burghuis, 130 S. Ct. at 2264; 
Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. at 1219; Powell, 130 S. Ct. at 1203. 
 14 See infra Part IV. 
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Miranda waiver is knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.  Finally, Part IV 
examines the implications for the future of the Miranda doctrine as the 
Supreme Court considers the subjective knowledge of suspects in 
determining whether a Miranda waiver is knowing, intelligent, and 
voluntary. 
II. CURRENT VIEWS ON MIRANDA 
Miranda, as currently understood, protects the Fifth and Sixth 
Amendment rights of the accused.15  The Fifth Amendment provides 
protection against compelled self-incrimination, providing that “[n]o 
person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against 
himself . . . .”16  Meanwhile, the Sixth Amendment guarantees an 
accused the assistance of counsel at all critical stages of a criminal 
proceeding.17  The Sixth Amendment states that “[i]n all criminal 
                                                                                                             
 15 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 436.  Although Miranda has its roots in the Fifth 
Amendment, the case is now understood as establishing rules to protect rights under both 
the Fifth and Sixth Amendments.  The Miranda Court described the original issue before 
the Court as “the admissibility of statements obtained from an individual who is 
subjected to custodial police interrogation and the necessity for procedures which assure 
that the individual is accorded his privilege under the Fifth Amendment to the 
Constitution not to be compelled to incriminate himself.”  Id. at 439 (emphasis added).  
In Patterson, 487 U.S. at 293, the Court explained that the required warnings adequately 
inform defendants not only of their Fifth Amendment rights, but of their Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel as well.  See also United States v. Seale, 600 F.3d 473, 484 
(5th Cir. 2010) (stating that Miranda has “roots in the Fifth and Sixth Amendments”); 
United States v. Tyler, 993 F.2d 1548 (Table) (6th Cir. 1993) (“A waiver of the right to 
counsel after receiving proper Miranda warnings constitutes a limited relinquishment of 
the right to counsel under both the Fifth and Sixth Amendment.”); United States v. 
Carneglia, 603 F.Supp.2d 488, 496 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) (noting that a “proper Miranda 
warning serves to advise an arrestee of both his Fifth Amendment right against self-
incrimination and his Sixth Amendment right to counsel”). 
 16 U.S. CONST. amend V. 
 17 U.S. CONST. amend VI.  See United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 659 n.25 
(1984) (noting that courts must reverse criminal defendants’ convictions “without any 
showing of prejudice [to defendant] when counsel was either totally absent, or prevented 
from assisting the accused during a critical stage of the proceeding”).  In particular, the 
Supreme Court has stated that a critical stage is “a step of a criminal proceeding . . . that 
h[olds] significant consequences for the accused.”  Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 696 
(2002).  A critical stage is one at which “[a]vailable defenses may be [ ] irretrievably 
lost,” Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52, 53 (1961), and “where rights are preserved or 
lost,” White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59, 60 (1963).  However, interrogation is one of the 
critical stages.  See Patterson, 487 U.S. at 290; Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 629–
30 (1986).  The Supreme Court has not provided a definitive list of Cronic “critical 
stages.”  United States v. Benford, 574 F.3d 1228, 1232 (9th Cir. 2010).  But the Court’s 
cases provide several examples of critical stages.  See, e.g., Iowa v. Tovar, 541 U.S. 77, 
81 (2004) (entry of a guilty plea); Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 358 (1977) 
(sentencing); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 236–37 (1967) (post-indictment 
lineup).  The Court has also provided examples of stages that are not critical.  See United 
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prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance 
of Counsel for his defenses.”18 
The Court established in Miranda a set of “procedural safeguards 
that require police to advise criminal suspects of their rights under the 
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments before commencing custodial 
interrogation.”19  While the possibility of physical coercion remained a 
fear, the focus of the Court in Miranda was on the psychological effects 
of custodial interrogation.20  The Court stated, for example, that it was 
concerned that “[e]ven without employing brutality, the ‘third degree’ or 
the specific stratagems [of police], the very fact of custodial interrogation 
exacts a heavy toll on individual liberty and trades on the weakness of 
individuals.”21  The original purpose underlying Miranda, thus, was to 
“reduce the likelihood that the suspects would fall victim to 
constitutionally impermissible practices of police interrogation . . . .”22  
Miranda accomplished this purpose through a preemptive effort to 
alleviate the inherently coercive atmosphere of custodial interrogations 
by informing or reminding the subject of the interrogation of the rights to 
silence and counsel.23  In this way, the focus of Miranda was on police 
                                                                                                             
States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 321 (1973) (post-indictment photographic lineup); Gilbert v. 
California, 388 U.S. 263, 267 (1967) (handwriting exemplar). 
 18 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.  See Williams, 430 U.S. at 398 (“The right to counsel . . . 
means at least that a person is entitled to the help of a lawyer at or after the time that 
judicial proceedings have been initiated against him whether by way of formal charge, 
preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or arraignment.” (internal quotes omitted)). 
 19 Florida v. Powell, 130 S. Ct. 1195 (2010) (citing Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 
195, 201 (1989)).  The Supreme Court originally defined custodial interrogation as 
“questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into 
custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.”  Miranda, 
384 U.S. at 444.  But see infra notes 160–61 and accompanying text (explaining that the 
Court distinguished between its earlier characterization of “custodial interrogation,” and 
the scenario presented in Maryland v. Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. 1213 (1210)). 
 20 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 448 (“[W]e stress that the modern practice of in-custody 
interrogation is psychologically rather than physically oriented”). 
 21 Id. at 456. 
 22 New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 656 (1984).  See also Rice v. Cooper, 148 
F.3d 747, 750 (7th Cir.1998) (“The relevant constitutional principles are aimed not at 
protecting people from themselves but at curbing abusive practices by public officers.”). 
 23 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467 (“We have concluded that without proper safeguards the 
process of in-custody interrogation of persons suspected or accused of crime contains 
inherently compelling pressures which work to undermine the individual’s will to resist 
and to compel him to speak where he would not otherwise do so freely. In order to 
combat these pressures and to permit a full opportunity to exercise the privilege against 
self-incrimination, the accused must be adequately and effectively apprised of his rights 
and the exercise of those rights must be fully honored.”). 
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conduct, not on whether a particular suspect was subject to psychological 
coercion in a particular case.24 
The warnings required by Miranda are part of the popular culture, 
and well known to all Americans with a television set.25  Accordingly, 
prior to any custodial interrogation, a defendant must be informed: 
[1] that he has the right to remain silent, [2] that anything he says 
can be used against him in a court of law, [3] that he has the right 
to the presence of an attorney, and [4] that if he cannot afford an 
attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if 
he so desires.26 
Although the content of the four warnings is necessary, no “magic 
words” or specific language has been required by the Court.27  Rather, 
the only requirement is that the Miranda warnings “clearly inform[ ]” the 
individual of his rights.28  In determining whether law enforcement 
officers adequately conveyed the four warnings, courts are not required 
to examine the words employed “as if construing a will or defining the 
terms of an easement.”29  Further, “[t]he inquiry is simply whether the 
warnings reasonably “convey to [a suspect] his rights as required by 
Miranda.’”30  All that is required is that the warning reasonably conveys 
the contents of the four rights specified in Miranda.31 
                                                                                                             
 24 Id. at 468 (“[W]e will not pause to inquire in individual cases whether the 
defendant was aware of his rights without a warning being given”). 
 25 United States v. Harris, 515 F.3d 1307, 1311 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (“As every 
television viewer knows, an officer ordinarily may not interrogate a suspect who is in 
custody without informing her of her Miranda rights.”); United States v. DeNoyer, 811 
F.2d 436, 439 n.4 (8th Cir. 1987) (noting that term “Miranda Warnings” “is commonly 
used, both in court and in television shows, to describe the ritual prescribed in Miranda v. 
Arizona”); United States v. Lacy, No. 2:09-CR-45 TS, 2010 WL 1451344, at *2 (D. 
Utah, Apr. 8, 2010) (defendant testified “that he was very aware of his Miranda rights 
because of television . . .”).  See also Russell Dean Covey, Miranda and the Media: 
Tracing the Cultural Evolution of a Constitutional Revolution, 10 CHAP. L. REV. 761, 761 
(2007) (“Not only did television make the Miranda warnings famous, its adoption of 
Miranda as an icon of criminal procedure may be main the reason Miranda is good law 
today.”). 
 26 Florida v. Powell, 130 S. Ct. 1195, 1203 (2010) (citing Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479). 
 27 See Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195, 203 (1989) (“The inquiry is simply 
whether the warnings reasonably ‘convey to [a suspect] his rights as required by 
Miranda.’”); California v. Prysock, 453 U.S. 355, 359 (1981) (per curiam) (“[N]o 
talismanic incantation [is] required to satisfy [Miranda’s] strictures”); Thai v. Mapes, 412 
F.3d 970, 977 (8th Cir. 2005) (“[T]he Court has recognized that there are no magic words 
that automatically satisfy Miranda’s constitutional concerns.”). 
 28 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 471. 
 29 Duckworth, 492 U.S. at 203 (quoting Prysock, 453 U.S. at 361). 
 30 Id. 
 31 See, e.g., id. 
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There are clear consequences to law enforcement for the failure to 
follow the procedure set forth in Miranda.  “[T]he prosecution may not 
use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from 
custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of 
procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-
incrimination.”32  This aspect of the Miranda decision is often the subject 
of the most impassioned debate.  Critics of the decision have, for a long 
time, claimed that valid confessions are excluded because of the failure 
of police to follow proper procedures and, as a result, the guilty go free.  
In 1986, for example, a Wisconsin judge wrote that the Supreme Court’s 
jurisprudence seemed to be “more intent on finding reasons to let 
admittedly guilty criminals escape punishment than in doing justice for 
society.”33  And, in 2000, Professor Cassel argued on PBS’s NewsHour 
that “70,000 violent criminal cases each year go unsolved because of 
Miranda.”34 
A. Assertion of Rights: Edwards, Minnick and Davis 
In Edwards v. Arizona35 and Minnick v. Mississippi, 36 the Supreme 
Court addressed the actions law enforcement must take after suspects 
assert their Miranda rights.  The defendant in Edwards had been arrested 
at his home on a warrant for robbery, burglary, and first-degree murder.37  
At the police station, the detectives provided the defendant with his 
Miranda warnings.38  The defendant acknowledged that that he 
understood his rights, provided a taped statement presenting an alibi 
defense, and indicated that he wanted to negotiate “a deal.”39  The 
defendant then indicated that he “want[ed] an attorney before making a 
deal.”40  At this point, the police stopped any questioning.41  However, 
the next morning, two detectives came to the jail to interview the 
defendant.42  The detectives provided the defendant with his Miranda 
                                                                                                             
 32 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444. 
 33 RALPH ADAM FINE, ESCAPE OF THE GUILTY xii (1986). 
 34 PBS Newshour: Revisiting Miranda (PBS television broadcast Jan. 6, 2000),  
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/law/jan-june00/miranda_1-6.html).  See also 
LAWRENCE S. WRIGHTSMAN & MARY L. PITMAN, THE MIRANDA RULING: ITS PAST, 
PRESENT, AND FUTURE 16–17 (Oxford Univ. Press 2010). 
 35 Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 481–84 (1981). 
 36 Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146 (1990). 
 37 Edwards, 451 U.S. at 478. 
 38 Id. 
 39 Id. at 479. 
 40 Id. 
 41 Id. 
 42 Id. at 479 
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warnings.43  The detectives were able to obtain a confession from the 
defendant by playing a portion of his accomplice’s statement.44  Based, 
in part, on this statement, the defendant was convicted.45 
The Supreme Court held that the use of the defendant’s second 
statement violated his Constitutional rights.46  In reaching this 
conclusion, the Court reasoned that the right to counsel required “special 
protection,” and that in order to provide that special protection additional 
safeguards would be necessary.47  The Court then set forth what has 
become known as the “Edwards rule”—when an accused requests an 
attorney, he may not be questioned unless an attorney has been made 
available or the accused initiates the conversation.48 
The Supreme Court revisited the Edwards rule in Minnick v. 
Mississippi.49  In Minnick, the defendant was accused of, among other 
crimes, murdering two people in Mississippi after escaping from a local 
jail.50  The defendant was arrested in California four months later.51  The 
defendant claimed that while in jail in California, the police mistreated 
him.52  The FBI subsequently interviewed the defendant.53  The FBI 
special agents provided the defendant with his Miranda warnings.54  The 
defendant provided a brief statement and told the special agents to “come 
back . . . when I have a lawyer,” and that he would make a more 
complete statement with his lawyer present.55 
The FBI special agents ended the interview and a court-appointed 
attorney met with the defendant.56  A few days later, a sheriff’s deputy 
from Mississippi arrived in California and interviewed the defendant.57  
The deputy provided defendant with his Miranda warnings; he 
                                                                                                             
 43 Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 479 (1981). 
 44 Id. 
 45 Id. 
 46 Id. at 487. 
 47 Id. at 483–84. 
 48 Id. at 484–85.  Cf. Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039, 1045–46 (1983) (suspect 
who had invoked his right to counsel initiated conversation while being transported by 
asking the officer, “Well, what is going to happen to me now?”). 
 49 498 U.S. 146, 146 (1990). 
 50 Id. at 148.  The defendant, along with a co-defendant, escaped from a local jail and 
broke into a mobile home.  Id.  During the course of the burglary, the men were 
interrupted by the owner and another man, accompanied by an infant.  Id.  The two adults 
were murdered.  Id.  Two women who subsequently arrived at the mobile home “were 
held at gunpoint, then bound hand and foot.”  Id. 
 51 Id. 
 52 Id. 
 53 Id. 
 54 Id. 
 55 Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146, 148–49 (1990). 
 56 Id. 
 57 Id. at 149. 
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proceeded to provide a statement to the deputy sheriff. 58  Based on the 
inculpatory statements to the deputy, as well as other evidence, the 
defendant was convicted on two counts of murder and sentenced to 
death.59 
The Minnick Court explained that Edwards was “designed to 
prevent police from badgering a defendant into waiving his previously 
asserted Miranda rights” and that the Edwards rule was intended to 
ensure that “any statement made in subsequent interrogation is not the 
result of coercive pressures.”60  For this reason, the Court believed that 
the presence of counsel prevents coercion and that the Edwards rule’s 
purpose is served by an interpretation that after a suspect has requested 
counsel, just the opportunity to consult with counsel is insufficient; 
instead, “the authorities may not initiate questioning of the accused in 
counsel’s absence.”61  This interpretation was justified by the view that 
meeting with an attorney would not eliminate the inherently coercive 
pressures of custody or the possibility of abusive tactics by the police.62  
The Court was also concerned that suspects may not fully understand 
their rights by just meeting with, or consulting, an attorney.63  The Court 
concluded: “when counsel is requested, interrogation must cease, and 
officials may not reinitiate interrogation without counsel present, 
whether or not the accused has consulted with his attorney.”64  The Court 
emphasized that this rule was not intended to undermine the principle of 
“individual responsibility” inherent in the decision by suspects to 
knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily waive their Miranda rights, even 
after counsel has been requested.65  The Court maintained that suspects 
                                                                                                             
 58 Id. at 148. 
 59 Id. 
 60 Id. at 150 (quoting Michigan v. Harvey, 494 U.S. 344, 350 (1990)).  The Court 
also asserted a practical justification for the Edwards rule: “Edwards conserves judicial 
resources which would otherwise be expended in making difficult determinations of 
voluntariness, and implements the protections of Miranda in practical and 
straightforward terms.”  Id. at 151. 
 61 Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146, 152 (1990). 
 62 Id. at 155. 
 63 Id.  The Court explained: 
Consultation is not a precise concept, for it may encompass variations 
from a telephone call to say that the attorney is en route, to a hurried 
interchange between the attorney and client in a detention facility 
corridor, to a lengthy in-person conference in which the attorney gives 
full and adequate advice respecting all matters that might be covered in 
further interrogations. 
Id. 
 64 Id. at 153. 
 65 Id. at 156. 
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retain the ability to waive their Miranda rights after counsel has been 
requested, so long as the suspects initiate the conversations.66 
The Court considered the necessary language the defendant must 
use to make the protections of Edwards and Minnick applicable in Davis 
v. United States.67  In Davis, the defendant was a suspect in a murder 
investigation conducted by the Naval Investigative Service (NIS).68  The 
defendant was interviewed at the NIS office and, after receiving the 
appropriate warnings required by military law, waived his rights to 
remain silent and to counsel, both orally and in writing.69  After about 
ninety minutes of questioning, the defendant said, “[m]aybe I should talk 
to a lawyer.”70  The NIS interviewers reminded the defendant of his 
rights, and he continued the interview for another hour before stating, “I 
think I want a lawyer before I say anything else.”71 
In reviewing whether the defendant’s initial statement constituted 
an invocation of Miranda rights for Edwards and Minnick purposes, the 
Court instructed lower courts to conduct an “objective inquiry” into 
whether the “statement . . . can reasonably be construed to be an 
expression of a desire for the assistance of an attorney.”72  The Court 
limited this inquiry, however, by holding that a “reference to an attorney 
that is ambiguous or equivocal” is not sufficient to trigger Miranda rights 
and require the cessation of a custodial interview.73  Rather, the suspect 
must unambiguously request counsel.74  In reaching this conclusion, the 
Davis Court explained: 
The rationale underlying Edwards is that the police must respect 
a suspect’s wishes regarding his right to have an attorney present 
during custodial interrogation. But when the officers conducting 
the questioning reasonably do not know whether or not the 
suspect wants a lawyer, a rule requiring the immediate cessation 
of questioning “would transform the Miranda safeguards into 
                                                                                                             
 66 Id. 
 67 Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452 (1994). 
 68 Id. at 454. 
 69 Id. at 454–55. 
 70 Id. at 455. 
 71 Id. 
 72 Id. at 458–59. 
 73 Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 459 (1994).  But see United States v. Plugh, 
576 F.3d 135, 143 (2d Cir. 2009) (“Davis does not instruct courts how to analyze an 
initial invocation of one’s Fifth Amendment rights following the Miranda warnings 
where no waiver occurred.  In our view, Davis only provides guidance for circumstances 
in which a defendant makes a claim that he subsequently invoked previously waived 
Fifth Amendment rights.”). 
 74 Davis, 512 U.S. at 459 (citing Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91, 97–98 (1984) (per 
curiam)). 
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wholly irrational obstacles to legitimate police investigative 
activity,” because it would needlessly prevent the police from 
questioning a suspect in the absence of counsel even if the 
suspect did not wish to have a lawyer present.75 
The Court acknowledged that this rule could “disadvantage some 
suspects who—because of fear, intimidation, lack of linguistic skills, or a 
variety of other reasons—will not clearly articulate their right to counsel 
although they actually want to have a lawyer present.”76  However, the 
Court believed that the potential loss of legitimate confessions that might 
not otherwise be obtained from a tighter rule outweighed this concern.77 
B. Waiver Inquiry 
The subject of a custodial interrogation may waive the rights 
described in Miranda.  In Miranda the Court held that a “defendant may 
waive effectuation” of the rights conveyed in the warnings “provided the 
waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently.”78  There is a 
presumption against waiver, of which the Government may overcome by 
a preponderance of the evidence.79 
The validity of a waiver must be assessed by a reviewing court on 
the totality of the circumstances.80  The prosecution must present 
evidence that the defendant was aware of “the nature of the right being 
abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it.”81  The 
waiver inquiry has two dimensions: First, the relinquishment of the right 
must have been voluntary in the sense that it was the product of a free 
                                                                                                             
 75 Id. at 460 (quoting Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 102 (1975)). 
 76 Id. at 461. 
 77 See id. 
 78 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).  Cf. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 
458 (1938).  Some analysts have suggested that because of the differences between the 
Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights, the Court has employed a different waiver standard.  
See, e.g., Geoffrey Sweeney, Note, If You Want It You Had Better Ask For It: How 
Montejo v. Louisiana Permits Law Enforcement to Sidestep the Sixth Amendment, 55 
LOY. L. REV. 619, 621 (2009).  However, the Supreme Court recently held that the waiver 
analysis is the same whether the suspect is waiving Miranda rights under the Fifth or 
Sixth Amendments.  Berghuis v. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. 2250, 2260 (2010) (“[T]here is 
no principled reason to adopt different standards for determining when an accused has 
invoked the Miranda right to remain silent and the Miranda right to counsel.”).  See also 
infra notes 184–88 and accompanying text (discussing Thompkins). 
 79 See Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 168 (1986); North Carolina v. Butler, 441 
U.S. 369, 373 (1966). 
 80 See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 475–77.  Cf. Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 725 
(1979) (finding that the requirements of Miranda apply the same to juveniles as adults). 
 81 Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421 (1986). 
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and deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or deception.82  
Second, the waiver must have been made with a full awareness of both 
the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the 
decision to abandon it.83 
The Supreme Court has yet to elaborate a set of factors for courts to 
consider in determining whether a suspect’s waiver was knowing, 
intelligent and voluntary.  The limit of the guidance provided by the 
Court is that “the totality of the circumstances surrounding the interview 
and waiver must reveal both an uncoerced choice and the requisite level 
of comprehension.”84  The Court has said that the question of whether 
Miranda rights have been knowingly and voluntarily waived must be 
determined “on the particular facts and circumstances surrounding [the] 
case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the 
accused.”85 
The closest the Court has come to setting forth a comprehensive list 
of factors to be considered in evaluating a Miranda waiver was in Fare v. 
Michael C.86  In Fare, the Court considered a confession by a juvenile.87  
In assessing whether a Miranda waiver by the juvenile was knowing, 
intelligent and voluntary, the Court explained: 
[The] totality of the circumstances approach is adequate to 
determine whether there has been a waiver even where 
interrogation of juveniles is involved . . . . The totality approach 
permits—indeed it mandates—inquiry into all the circumstances 
surrounding the interrogation.  This includes evaluation of the 
juvenile’s age, experience, education, background, and 
intelligence, and into whether he has the capacity to understand 
the warnings given him, the nature of his Fifth Amendment 
rights, and the consequences of waiving those rights.88 
The Fare Court did not, however, suggest that the list provided was 
exhaustive.89 
                                                                                                             
 82 Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 482 (1981); Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 
404 (1977). 
 83 Edwards, 451 U.S. at 482. 
 84 Machacek v. Hofbauer, 213 F.3d 947, 954 (6th Cir.2000) (citing Moran, 475 U.S. 
at 421). 
 85 North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 374–75 (1966) (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 
304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938)). 
 86 442 U.S. 707 (1979). 
 87 Id. at 710–11. 
 88 Id. at 725. 
 89 In contrast, compare the detailed direction provided by the Supreme Court in 
reviewing whether consents to searches are voluntary in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 
U.S. 218 (1973).  In that case, the Supreme Court relied upon cases assessing the 
voluntary nature of confessions, and held that the voluntary nature of providing consent 
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Many of the Circuit Courts of Appeals have established a more 
comprehensive set of factors for consideration when assessing whether a 
waiver of Miranda rights was voluntary.  The Seventh Circuit, for 
example, has suggested that trial courts consider, among other factors, 
the defendant’s background, his mental and physical condition, and the 
duration and conditions of detention.90  Similarly, the Eighth Circuit has 
explained that examination of the totality of circumstances includes, but 
is not limited to, such considerations as the “background, experience, and 
conduct” of the defendant.91  The Tenth Circuit has identified five factors 
that should be considered to determine whether a Miranda waiver was 
voluntary: 
(1) the age, intelligence, and education of the defendant; (2) the 
length of [any] detention; (3) the length and nature of the 
questioning; (4) whether the defendant was advised of [his or] 
her constitutional rights; and (5) whether the defendant was 
subjected to physical punishment. 92 
The Third Circuit has provided several factors to guide this analysis: the 
defendant’s age, education, intelligence, occupation, advice of rights 
administered, length of detention, length of questioning, physical or 
mental punishment or exhaustion.93  Accordingly, an advisement of 
Miranda rights and a subsequent valid waiver of those rights are 
significant factors, among other factors, to be considered in determining 
whether a confession is voluntary.  Significantly, no single factor is 
dispositive.  The purpose of looking at all of the factors involved is to 
determine whether the will of the suspect was overborne through 
improper coercion.94 
                                                                                                             
to a search must be assessed in “the totality of all the surrounding circumstances—both 
the characteristics of the accused and the details of the interrogation.”  Id. at 226 (internal 
citations omitted).  The Court continued: “Some of the factors taken into account have 
included the youth of the accused; his lack of education; or his low intelligence; the lack 
of any advice to the accused of his constitutional rights; the length of detention; the 
repeated and prolonged nature of the questioning; and the use of physical punishment 
such as the deprivation of food or sleep”  Id. 
 90 United States v. Steele, 82 Fed. App’x 172, 175 (7th Cir. 2003). 
 91 United States v. Jones, 23 F.3d 1307, 1313 (8th Cir. 1994) (citing United States v. 
Barahona, 990 F.2d 412, 418 (8th Cir. 1993)). 
 92 United States v. Carrizales-Toledo, 454 F.3d 1142, 1153 (10th Cir. 2006); United 
States v. Glover, 104 F.3d 1570, 1579 (10th Cir. 1997).  These factors are not exclusive.  
The Tenth Circuit has also instructed trial courts to consider whether “the government 
obtained the statements by physical or psychological coercion such that the defendant’s 
will was overborne.”  United States v. Rith, 164 F.3d 1323, 1333 (10th Cir. 1999). 
 93 Miller v. Fenton, 741 F.2d 1456, 1460 (3d Cir. 1984). 
 94 See, e.g., United States v. Artis, No. 5:10-cr-15-01, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97279 
at *27 (D. Vt. Sept. 16, 2010) (determining whether statements by suspect with a criminal 
history were the result of coercion). 
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III. THE COURT’S RECENT MIRANDA CASES: MONTEJO, POWELL, 
SHATZER, AND THOMPKINS 
Between May 2009 and the end of the October 2009 term, the 
Supreme Court decided four cases, described below, dealing with 
Miranda-related issues.  In deciding these four cases, the Court began a 
process of limiting Miranda by focusing less on the objective actions of 
the police and more on the subjective knowledge of suspects. 
A. Montejo 
The Supreme Court decided Montejo v. Louisiana in May 2009.95  
In Montejo the defendant was a twenty-three-year-old at who had not 
graduated from high school, had an “extensive” juvenile record, and had 
been incarcerated for six years in Florida.96  The wife of the victim found 
him dead in their home.97  The victim had suffered two gunshot 
wounds.98  The defendant became a suspect because several neighbors 
noticed his blue van, which had a “distinctive chrome cattle bar,” near 
the victim’s home at the time of the murder.99  The police later 
determined that a disgruntled former employee of the victim had been an 
accomplice to the defendant.100  The former employee was familiar with 
the victim’s routine and would have been aware that he was likely to 
possess a large amount of cash on the day of the murder.101   
The defendant was taken into custody and repeatedly provided with 
his Miranda warnings, signed written waivers, and consented to speak to 
the police detectives.102  Over the course of four hours of interviews, the 
defendant admitted that he had shot the victim during an attempted 
burglary.103  The defendant initially claimed that his only involvement 
was in driving a co-defendant to the victim’s home and leaving him there 
without knowing that the co-defendant was going to rob and kill the 
victim.104 
Montejo then proceeded to tell other versions of his story before 
asking to speak with an attorney, at which point the detectives ended the 
                                                                                                             
 95 Montejo v. Louisiana, 129 S. Ct. 2079 (2009). 
 96 State v. Montejo, 974 So. 2d 1238, 1264 (La. 2008). 
 97 Id. at 1241. 
 98 Id. 
 99 Id. at 1242.  The police later discovered the defendant’s DNA beneath the victim’s 
fingernails.  Id. 
 100 Id. at 1241. 
 101 Id. 
 102 The defendant conceded that he received appropriate Miranda warnings.  Brief for 
Petitioner at 2–3, Montejo v. Louisiana, 129 S. Ct. 2079 (2009) (No. 07-1529). 
 103 State v. Montejo, 974 So. 2d 1238, 1244 (La. 2008). 
 104 Id. at 1245. 
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interview.105  The interview resumed, however, at the request of the 
defendant.106  The defendant told several variations of the story, finally 
admitting that he had believed that the house was unlocked, contained a 
lot of money, and would be unoccupied.107  The defendant claimed that 
he found a gun inside the house and picked it up to scare anyone away 
who might come home.108  When the victim returned home, the 
defendant hit him over the head with the gun, fired a warning shot, and 
then, after a struggle, shot him in the head.109  The defendant then fled in 
the victim’s vehicle, threw the gun into a lake, gave some money to his 
co-defendants, and used the rest of the money to pay bills.110  The 
validity of Montejo’s first statement was not an issue before the Supreme 
Court.111 
Four days after Montejo was first detained and interrogated, the 
officers brought him before a judge for a mandatory initial hearing.112  
The hearing was not transcribed, but the minute entry indicates that the 
defendant was denied bail and had counsel appointed through the Office 
of the Indigent Defender.113  After the hearing, the detectives again 
approached Montejo.114  They requested that he accompany them to the 
area where he had allegedly thrown the gun into the lake.115  According 
to the detectives, Montejo denied that he had obtained counsel.116  
Montejo subsequently testified at the trial that he told the detectives, 
“Yeah, I think I got a lawyer appointed to me.”117 
Montejo was again provided with his Miranda rights and again 
agreed to waive the same.  He accompanied the detectives to the lake, 
but the gun was never found.118  He also wrote a letter to the victim’s 
widow, in which he sought to minimize his role in the murder and 
expressed some remorse.119 
                                                                                                             
 105 Id. at 1244–47. 
 106 Id. 
 107 Id. 
 108 Id. at  1247. 
 109 State v. Montejo, 974 So. 2d 1238, 1247 (La. 2008). 
 110 Id. at 1248. 
 111 Brief for Respondent at 15 n.3, Montejo v. Louisiana, 129 S. Ct. 2079 (2009) (No. 
07-1529). 
 112 Montejo, 129 S. Ct. at 2082. 
 113 Id. 
 114 Id. 
 115 Id. 
 116 Brief for Respondent at 15, Montejo, 129 S. Ct. 2079 (2009) (No. 07-1529). 
 117 State v. Montejo, 974 So. 2d 1238, 1262 (La. 2008). 
 118 See id. at 1250 n.44. 
 119 The two-page letter is reprinted in the Louisiana Supreme Court’s opinion, and 
reads as follows (with spelling and punctuation unaltered, but capitalization normalized 
for legibility): 
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The issue before the Court was whether to overrule Michigan v. 
Jackson.120  Jackson concerned the ability of law enforcement officers to 
initiate an interrogation once a defendant had obtained counsel at an 
arraignment or similar proceeding.121  The Court acknowledged that the 
Sixth Amendment guarantees a defendant the right to counsel at all 
critical stages of a criminal proceeding, and that the interrogation was 
one of those critical stages.122 
                                                                                                             
Ms. Ferrari, 
This is very hard to put in the right words but I will try hard. My soul is 
feeling you very much. If I could rwind time I wish that bullet would of 
hit me. Please finish reading. I really want you to know I had no intention 
on his death and I am in a log of true pain I’m so sorry I can picture your 
heart dropping at sight it is eating me up inside so bad. I try to talk to 
Loue every day to say I’m sorry and wish I could let you feel my 
emotion to know truely how sorry and how bad this is tearing me up. I 
promise you I didn’t cold blood kill Mr. Loue if I could change places I 
would be dead. Please be strong only God really knows why this happen 
you a beautiful woman and I’m huting more than you would really 
expect to know I caused that I did crimes before but I’m really not as 
harmful as what happen please forgive me Ms. Ferrari I prey for you to 
be strong and get through I will prey every day I’m accepting God for 
once in my life and begging for forgiveness I’m so sorry please forgive 
me I was going for a simple burgulary in and out that someone put me on 
and instead I found the gun so I thought if some reason some one does 
come in I can scare with the gun and run but he wasn’t scared I swear I 
tried to just run Ms. Fearri but he wouldn’t let me I even fired a warning 
which skint him on the side but he still kept coming strong I couldn’t see 
then the shot and he flew back I ran with no ride I grabed his keys I 
almost shot myself the gun was cocked back agin and I didn’t know how 
thats how scared I was so I shot into the couch I know you needed to 
know this Ms. Ferri and may God make you strong please I need your 
forgiveness Ms. Ferri I’m more than sorry for what happen please forgive 
me please I’m sorry I lost my life too, my baby my beautiful girl I’m so 
sorry. [signature] Please forgive me Miss. Ferri may God be with you 
and make you strong because hes killing me inside. 
Id. at 1250 n.49 (reprinted verbatim). 
 120 475 U.S. 625 (1986). 
 121 Montejo, 129 S. Ct. at 2082.  The Montejo majority and the dissent disagree about 
the actual holding of Jackson.  The majority claims that Jackson held that law 
enforcement officers could not initiate an interrogation of a defendant “once he has 
requested counsel at an arraignment or similar proceeding.”  Id.  The dissent claims that 
Jackson stood for the proposition that law enforcement officers could not initiate an 
interrogation once an attorney-client relationship had been established.  Id. at 2095 
(Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 122 Id. at 2085 (majority opinion).  The Court has not provided a definitive list of 
“critical stages.”  But some cases have held certain stages to be critical.  See, e.g., Iowa v. 
Tovar, 541 U.S. 77, 81 (2004) (entry of a guilty plea); Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 
358 (1977) (sentencing); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 236–37 (1967) (post-
indictment lineup).  See also supra note 17 and accompanying text (providing additional 
examples of “critical stages). 
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The Montejo Court did not re-examine whether the right to have 
counsel present at an interrogation may be waived, so long as the waiver 
is “voluntary, knowing, and intelligent.”123  The Court explained that 
“when a defendant is read his Miranda rights (which include the right to 
have counsel present during interrogation) and agrees to waive those 
rights, that typically does the trick . . . .”124  The Court refused to apply a 
prophylactic rule prohibiting any contact with represented defendants, 
similar to the rule established in Edwards v. Arizona.125  In Edwards, the 
Court had held that once a suspect requests the presence of counsel, no 
further interrogation may be initiated by the officers.126  This decision 
was based on the premise that such a rule was necessary “to prevent 
police from badgering a defendant into waiving his previously asserted 
Miranda rights.”127  In Montejo, the Court placed a greater obligation on 
the defendant or suspect to speak up.  The Court said: 
[A] defendant who does not want to speak to the police without 
counsel present  need only say as much when he is first 
approached and given the Miranda warnings. At that point, not 
only must the immediate contact end, but “badgering” by later 
requests is prohibited. If that regime suffices to protect the 
integrity of “a suspect’s voluntary choice not to speak outside his 
lawyer’s presence” before his arraignment, it is hard to see why it 
would not also suffice to protect that same choice after 
arraignment . . . .128 
Accordingly, the Court in Montejo was willing to abandon the Jackson 
rule because the existing safeguards of the Miranda regime are sufficient 
to guarantee that any waiver is truly voluntary.129 
                                                                                                             
 123 Montejo, 129 S. Ct. at 2085 (citing Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285, 292 n.4 
(1988); Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 404 (1977); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 
464 (1938)). 
 124 Id. 
 125 451 U.S. 477 (1981). 
 126 Id. at 484–85. 
 127 Montejo, 129 S. Ct. at 2085 (citing Michigan v. Harvey, 494 U.S. 344, 350 
(1990)). 
 128 Id. at 2090 (citations omitted). 
 129 A number of commentators have criticized the approach taken by the Montejo 
Court.  The staff of the University of Kansas Law Review stated: 
Montejo is an abrupt departure from twenty-four years of precedent 
under Jackson. Indeed, the appellant Montejo did not even make the 
appropriate arguments to succeed in a Jackson-less legal landscape.  The 
five-to-four split amongst the Court indicates that this was a contentious 
decision.  Jackson’s longevity suggests that Justice Scalia may have 
exaggerated the rule’s practical problems.  Although Jackson’s policy 
interests may be served by the other prophylactic rules, the Court should 
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B. Powell 
In Florida v. Powell, the Court considered the Tampa Police 
Department’s use of a Miranda form that did not explicitly advise the 
suspect that he could have a lawyer present during questioning.130  The 
defendant in Powell was facing possible charges of being a convicted 
felon in possession of a gun.131  He had ten prior felony convictions.132 
After arresting the defendant at his girlfriend’s apartment in 
connection with a robbery investigation, the police took him into 
custody.133  The police conducted a search of the apartment and 
discovered a gun underneath the bed in the room that the defendant 
appeared to have been occupying, at the time of their arrival.134  Prior to 
his interview, the police showed the defendant the standard waiver 
form.135  He indicated that he understood his rights and signed the waiver 
form.136  At trial, as the State pointed out in its brief, the defendant 
acknowledged that he had “waived the right to have an attorney present 
during . . . questioning.”137  He then confessed to his prior felonies, 
possessing the weapon for protection, and knowing that he was 
prohibited by law from possessing the weapon.138 
The defendant argued that the warnings used by the Tampa Police 
were insufficient because they did not inform him that he could have an 
attorney present during questioning.139  The warning form did not state 
that the suspect had the right to have counsel present during 
questioning.140  Instead, the form stated that the suspect could “talk to” 
an attorney “before answering any of our questions.”141  This argument 
was based on a reading of the warnings that suggested that while suspect 
                                                                                                             
have attempted to fine-tune Jackson instead of simply dumping it and 
risking exposure to even a small category of defendants. 
58 KAN. L. REV. 1311, 1352–53 (2010). 
 130 Florida v. Powell, 130 S. Ct. 1195, 1200 (2010). 
 131 Id.; See  FLA. STAT. ANN. § 790.23(1). 
 132 Brief for Petitioner at 4, Powell, 130 S. Ct. 1195 (2010) (No. 08-1175). 
 133 Powell, 130 S. Ct. at 1200. 
 134 Florida v. Powell, 998 So. 2d 531, 532 (Fla. 2008). 
 135 Powell, 130 S. Ct. at 1200.  The form states: “You have the right to remain silent.  
If you give up the right to remain silent, anything you say can be used against you in 
court.  You have the right to talk to a lawyer before answering any of our questions.  If 
you cannot afford to hire a lawyer, one will be appointed for you without cost and before 
any questioning.  You have the right to use any of these rights at any time you want 
during this interview.”  Id.  (internal citations omitted). 
 136 Id. 
 137 Brief for Petitioner at 4, Powell, 130 S. Ct. 1195 (2010) (No. 08-1175). 
 138 Powell, 130 S. Ct. at 1200. 
 139 Id. 
 140 Id. at 1201. 
 141 Id. at 1204. 
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could consult with an attorney, he did not have a right to have an 
attorney present during questioning.142 
The Court rejected this argument and held that the warnings 
provided to the defendant were sufficient to convey to the defendant that 
he could have an attorney present.143  In reaching this conclusion, the 
Court explicitly relied upon the common sense of the defendant.144  The 
Court said: 
A reasonable suspect in a custodial setting who has just been read 
his rights, we believe, would not come to the counterintuitive 
conclusion that he is obligated, or allowed, to hop in and out of 
the holding area to seek his attorney’s advice.  Instead, the 
suspect would likely assume that he must stay put in the 
interrogation room and that his lawyer would be there with him 
the entire time.145 
The Court also rejected the idea that the police would intentionally use 
an inadequate form in the hopes of tricking suspects into waiving their 
Miranda rights.146  Instead, the Court accepted the position of the 
government, especially the Solicitor General as amicus curiae, that law 
enforcement would prefer to eliminate the risks of suppression and the 
costs of litigation by providing adequate warnings.147 
C. Shatzer 
In Maryland v. Shatzer, the Supreme Court considered the 
implications of a break in custody on the Edwards rule.  The defendant 
was a suspect in the alleged sexual abuse of his three-year-old son.148  A 
police detective assigned to the Child Advocacy Center had received a 
                                                                                                             
 142 The Florida Supreme Court adopted this reasoning.  Id. at 1205.  (“The ‘before 
questioning’ warning suggests to a reasonable person in the suspect’s shoes that he or she 
can only consult with an attorney before questioning; there is nothing in that statement 
that suggests the attorney can be present during the actual questioning.”). 
 143 Id. at 1204–05. 
 144 The Court cited to two cases where warnings, read in context, adequately 
conveyed to the suspect his right to have counsel present during interrogations.  Florida v. 
Powell, 130 S. Ct. 1195, 1204–05 (2010) (citing Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195 
(1989); California v. Prysock, 453 U.S. 355 (1981) (per curiam)). 
 145 Id. at 1205. 
 146 Id. at 1205–06.  At oral argument, Justice Sotomayor raised the question of 
whether the police may have intentionally used improper warnings.  She asked counsel 
for the government: “Why wouldn’t the intent of the entity at issue be placed in question? 
Meaning, you could have—the police here could have chosen to be explicit, but instead 
they chose be—to obfuscate a little bit and be less explicit. Shouldn’t we assume that that 
is an intent to deceive or perhaps to confuse?”  Transcript of Oral Argument at 15–16, 
Powell, 130 S. Ct. 1195 (2010) (No. 08-1175). 
 147 Powell, 130 S. Ct. at 1205–06. 
 148 Maryland v. Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. 1213 (2010). 
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report from a social worker that the suspect had received oral sex from 
the child.149  The detective went to a state prison to interview the suspect, 
who at the time was serving a sentence for an unrelated sexual offense.  
The detective provided the defendant with his Miranda warnings and 
obtained a written waiver.  The defendant, after some initial confusion 
about the allegations being discussed—indicated that he would not talk 
without an attorney present.150  The detective then terminated the 
interview.151 
Approximately two and one-half years later, the police re-opened 
the investigation.152  The defendant remained incarcerated on the 
unrelated offense.153  The detective, who had not worked on the original 
investigation, provided the defendant with his Miranda warnings and 
obtained a written waiver.154  The defendant denied any physical contact 
and agreed to take a polygraph examination.155  Prior to the polygraph 
examination five days later, the defendant admitted to masturbating in 
front of the child and then said, “I didn’t force him.  I didn’t force 
him.”156 
The defendant was charged with the sexual abuse of his son. 157  He 
filed a motion to suppress his statements, as having been made in 
violation of Edwards.  The trial court denied the motion.  The defendant 
was subsequently convicted of sexual child abuse and sentenced to 
                                                                                                             
 149 The child said that the defendant “pulled his pants down, exposed his penis, 
apparently put milk on his penis, and told [the child] to lick his worm . . . .”  Brief for 
Petitioner at 3, Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. 1213 (2010) (No. 08-680).  See also Brief for 
Respondent at 1, Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. 1213 (2010) (No. 08-680). 
 150 Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. at 1217.  The detective wrote in his report: “When I attempted 
to again initiate the interview, he [the defendant] told me that he would not talk without 
an attorney present.”  Brief for Respondent at 1, Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. 1213 (2010) (No. 08-
680). 
 151 Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. at 1217. 
 152 According the brief from the State of Maryland, the investigation was reopened 
because the police had received “additional, more specific allegations ‘because the child 
was more mature, able to articulate what had happened to him several years before.’”  
Brief for Petitioner at 4, Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. 1213 (2010) (No. 08-680) (citing Testimony 
from Suppression Hearing contained in Joint Appendix). 
 153 Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. at 1217–18. 
 154 Id. at 1218. 
 155 Brief for the Petitioner at 5. 
 156 Id.  There is some confusion about the exact timing of the inculpatory statements 
about masturbating in front of the child.  The Supreme Court reports that the statements 
were made during the initial interview with the new detective.  Id.  This same report of 
the facts is contained in the opinion from the Maryland Court of Appeals, and appears to 
be consistent with an agreed statement of facts.  Shatzer v. State, 954 A.2d 1118, 1121–
22 n.3 (Md. 2008).  However, the brief from the state indicates that this admission 
occurred during the pre-polygraph interview.  Brief for Petitioner at 5, Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. 
1213 (2010) (No. 08-680).  The defendant’s brief is silent on this factual issue. 
 157 Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. at 1218. 
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fifteen years in prison, consecutive to the sentence he was serving, with 
all but five years suspended.158 
The Court, in analyzing the defendant’s claim under Edwards, 
emphasized that the Edwards Rule “is not a constitutional mandate, but 
[a] judicially prescribed prophylaxis.”159  The court then described what 
it referred to as the “paradigm Edwards case”: 
That is a case in which the suspect has been arrested for a 
particular crime and is held in uninterrupted pretrial custody 
while that crime is being actively investigated.  After the initial 
interview, and up to and including the second one, he remains cut 
off from his normal life and companions, “thrust into” and 
isolated in an “unfamiliar,” “police dominated atmosphere,” 
where his captors “appear to control [his] fate.”160 
The Court then explained that, in contrast to the paradigm Edwards case, 
if a suspect is “returned to his normal life,” then any “change of heart 
regarding interrogation without counsel” is not likely to have been 
coerced.161  For this reason, the Court rejected the idea that the Edwards 
rule amounted to an “eternal” prohibition against police initiated 
interrogations after a suspect requested the presence of counsel.  Instead, 
the Court held that the police may re-approach a suspect who had 
requested counsel after the “termination” of custody and “any of its 
lingering effects.”162 
The Shatzer Court proceeded to determine the appropriate length of 
time of the break in custody before police may re-approach a suspect 
who had requested counsel.  The Court set the time limit at fourteen 
days.163  The Court explained that fourteen days is “plenty of time for the 
suspect to get reacclimated to his normal life, to consult with friends and 
counsel, and to shake off any residual coercive effects of his prior 
custody.”164  In Shatzer’s case, even though he was incarcerated, because 
he was returned to his “accustomed surroundings,” and because his 
detention in prison was unrelated to his willingness to cooperate in the 
                                                                                                             
 158 Id.; Shatzer, 954 A.2d at 1122.  The defendant waived his right to a jury trial and 
was convicted on an agreed statement of facts consisting of a summary of the victim’s 
statement and the defendant’s admissions.  Id. at n.3. 
 159 Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. at 1220 (citing, inter alia, Montejo v. Louisiana, 129 S. Ct. 
2079, 2085–86 (2009)). 
 160 Id. (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 456–57 (1966). 
 161 Id. at 1221.  The Court was also concerned that extending Edwards would increase 
the costs to society by excluding voluntary confessions from trial while minimally 
deterring police misconduct.  Id. at 1221–22. 
 162 Id. at 1222. 
 163 Id. at 1223. 
 164 Id.  The Court did not provide any rationale for choosing fourteen days. 
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investigation,” the two and one-half year break between interrogations 
was sufficient to permit a court to conclude that his waiver of his 
Miranda rights during the second interrogation was knowing, intelligent, 
and voluntary.165 
D. Thompkins 
In Berghuis v. Thompkins,166 the Court considered the manner in 
which a suspect must invoke, or waive, Miranda rights.  Thompkins was 
a suspect in a shooting outside a mall in January 2000.167  The victims of 
the shooting were involved in a dispute with the defendant and several 
other men while driving through a mall parking lot in Michigan.168  The 
defendant and the other men proceeded to follow the victims, with the 
defendant sitting in the passenger seat of his van.169  The van pulled up 
alongside the victims.  Thompkins said, “What you say, Big Dog” and 
then fired several shots into the victims car, killing one person and 
wounding another.170 
The surviving victim identified the defendant from a photograph 
taken by a security camera.171  The defendant was arrested a year later in 
Ohio.172  Detectives from Michigan traveled to Ohio to interview the 
defendant.173  The detectives read the defendant a form advising him of 
his Miranda rights.174  The defendant orally indicated that he understood 
his rights, but refused to sign the form.175  The detective, at a suppression 
hearing, described the interview as “very, very one-sided,” and as 
“nearly a monologue.”176  Further, the defendant mostly “remained 
silent,” but “shared very limited verbal responses . . .” and “talk[ed] . . . 
very sporadically.”177  Mostly the defendant said, “I don’t know” or 
                                                                                                             
 165 Maryland v. Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. 1213, 1227 (2010).  The Court maintained a 
presumption that waivers after a suspect invokes the right to counsel are involuntary.  Id. 
at 1223 n.7; see also id. at 1227 (Thomas, J., concurring in part). 
 166 130 S. Ct. 2250 (2010).  The case was brought as a habeas petition in federal 
District Court in Michigan. 
 167 Id. at 2256. 
 168 See Brief for the Petitioner at 7 (available at http://www.americanbar.org/ 
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 169 Id. at 7-8. 
 170 Thompkins v. Berghuis, 547 F.3d 572, 575 (6th Cir. 2008). 
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 172 Id. at 576. 
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“yeah.”178  The detective said that the defendant occasionally gave non-
verbal responses to questions, such as making eye contact, looking up, or 
nodding his head.179 
The interview lasted approximately two hours and forty-five 
minutes.180  At the end, the detective asked the defendant whether he 
“believed in God.”181  The detective testified that the about the 
defendant’s response as follows: 
I finally looked at him, and I asked him, tried to take a different 
tact, what I call a spiritual tact, whether or not he believed in 
God.  He made eye-contact with me for one of the few times that 
he did for the interview.  I saw his eyes well up with tears.  He 
answered me orally and said, “Yes.” I asked if he had prayed to 
God? And he said “Yes.” And I asked him if he had asked God to 
forgive him for – I believe the words were, and I quoted them in 
my report verbatim “shooting that boy down.” And he answered, 
“Yes.”182 
The defendant was, on the basis of this inculpatory statement and other 
evidence, convicted of murder.183 
The Supreme Court held that a suspect must invoke the right to 
remain silent (and the right to counsel) unambiguously.184  The Court 
clarified that, while a waiver of Miranda rights cannot be inferred from 
silence, a waiver can be established without a “formal or express 
statement.”185  Instead, an “implicit waiver” of Miranda rights can be 
inferred after suspects have been informed of their rights from silence 
combined with a “course of conduct indicating waiver.”186  The Court 
explained: 
Where the prosecution shows that a Miranda warning was given 
and that it was understood by the accused, and accused’s 
uncoerced statement establishes an implied waiver of the right to 
remain silent . . . . As a general proposition, the law can presume 
that an individual who, with a full understanding of his or her 
rights, acts in a manner inconsistent with their exercise has made 
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 179 Id. 
 180 Id. 
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 182 Berghuis v. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. 2250, 2257 (2010). 
 183 Thompkins, 547 F.3d at 574. 
 184 Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. at 2260. 
 185 Id. at 2261. 
 186 Id. (quoting North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 376 (1979)). 
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a deliberate choice to relinquish the protection those rights 
afford.187 
In other words, the Court explained, “a suspect who has received and 
understood the Miranda warnings, and has not invoked his Miranda 
rights, waives the right to remain silent by making an uncoerced 
statement . . . .”188 
In Thompkins, thus, the Court was able to infer a knowing, 
intelligent and voluntary waiver of Miranda rights by the defendant.  
There was little dispute that the defendant received his Miranda 
warnings, and there was no evidence of coercion.  A waiver was inferred 
from the mere act of the defendant providing a statement under these 
circumstances.  The Court said, “If [the defendant] wanted to remain 
silent, he could have said nothing . . . or he could have unambiguously 
invoked his Miranda rights and ended the interrogation.”189  In contrast, 
ambiguity would harm law enforcement efforts, as “police would be 
required to make difficult decisions about an accused’s unclear intent and 
face the consequence of suppression ‘if they guess wrong.’”190 
IV. COMMON THEMES IN RECENT SUPREME COURT MIRANDA CASES 
Some commentators have suggested that the recent Miranda cases 
reflect a continued effort by conservative or prosecution oriented Justices 
to slowly peel back Miranda protections.  In a web posting, for example, 
Professor Sherrilyn Ifill of the University of Maryland suggested, after 
the Thompkins decision, that the conservative majority’s approach to 
Miranda is the result of a disdain for the initial decision, coupled with a 
lack of real-world and defense counsel experience on the Court.191  
Professor Patrick Noonan posted an article particularly responding to 
Thompkins, entitled The Death of Miranda.192  In this article, Noonan 
suggests that the Supreme Court’s decisions “disrupt[] the purpose and 
meaning of Miranda.  That is, [Thompkins] takes the power to exert 
                                                                                                             
 187 Id. at 2261–62. 
 188 Id. at 2264. 
 189 Id. at 2263.  Although Miranda stated that the government has a “‘heavy burden’ 
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control over the course of the interrogation from the defendant and 
places it back into the hands of the interrogator.”193 
The limiting of Miranda was also noted in the media.  Time 
Magazine published an article entitled, Has the Supreme Court 
Decimated Miranda?194 After reviewing the Thompkins decision, the 
magazine wrote: 
For years, conservatives continued to attack the Miranda 
decision, holding out hope that it would be reversed. In 2000, it 
seemed like it might finally happen—the court had a case that 
posed a direct challenge to Miranda, and it had a five-member 
conservative majority. But in the end, Chief Justice William 
Rehnquist, leader of the conservative bloc, wrote an opinion for a 
7-2 majority reaffirming Miranda. “Miranda has become 
embedded in routine police practice,” he wrote, “to the point 
where the warnings have become part of our national culture.” 
Instead of overruling Miranda, the conservative Justices have 
now done something they are doing to many landmark 
progressive decisions—quietly chipping away to the point that 
they have little power left.195 
In a similar fashion, The New York Times reported that the recent 
decisions had “narrowed and clarified the scope of the Miranda 
decision.”196  The Washington Post noted that “[t]he Supreme Court 
[has] backed off . . . from strict enforcement of its historic Miranda 
decision.”197 
A. Consideration of Criminal Backgrounds in Montejo, Powell, 
Shatzer, and Thompkins 
A close reading of the recent opinions, however, suggests that there 
may be a subtler theme running through the cases than a straightforward 
attack on Miranda.  In all four recent Miranda cases, the court chose to 
accept cases with defendants who had significant experience with the 
criminal justice system.  The defendants in these cases, it can be inferred, 
were familiar with the Miranda warnings from having received them in 
prior contact with law enforcement.  In addition, it can be inferred that 
                                                                                                             
 193 Id. (internal citations omitted). 
 194 Adam Cohen, Has the Supreme Court Decimated Miranda?, TIME (June 3, 2010), 
http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1993580,00.html. 
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June 2, 2010, at A15. 
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the defendants were aware that the police would honor the Miranda 
warnings.  Finally, it could be inferred that the defendants were familiar 
with police tactics and were less likely to be intimidated by the isolation 
of custodial interrogation.  This was raised, sometimes implicitly in the 
four cases: 
1. Montejo 
The Court’s decision in Montejo does not explicitly mention the 
defendant’s background and experience with the criminal justice system.  
However, this appears to be an unstated factor in the decision.  At oral 
argument, counsel for the State of Louisiana noted that the defendant had 
waived his Miranda rights on seven prior occasions.198  The Court’s 
decision extensively discusses the potential badgering by the police 
during custodial interrogations that Jackson was designed to prevent.199  
However, this type of badgering is likely to have a greater effect on a 
criminal defendant who is inexperienced with police tactics.  Some 
observers have noted that by describing the purpose of Jackson as 
proscribing police badgering of suspects, the court gave less weight to 
the interest of protecting the relationship “between the uninformed 
suspect and his hopefully knowledgeable counsel.”200  This contrasts 
defendants with experience and knowledge about the criminal justice 
system who are less likely to be impacted.  A defendant with multiple 
prior arrests is more likely to see badgering as a tactic. 
In the Montejo decision this contrast is especially clear.  In deciding 
to permit officers to approach represented defendants, the Montejo Court 
implicitly took into account the background and experience of the 
defendant.  The result of the Montejo decision is most likely to be felt by 
defendants who, some have noted, are “mentally retarded, mentally ill, 
and juveniles.”201   For example, Geoffrey Sweeney notes that the 
“procedural consequences of the Montejo decision place vulnerable 
defendants at peril.”202  Yet the Court seems to be making law based on 
the assumption that most defendants are like the defendant in Montejo.  
The Court said, “No reason exists to assume that a defendant like 
Montejo, who has done nothing at all to express his intentions with 
                                                                                                             
 198 Transcript of Oral Argument at 26, Montejo v. Louisiana, 129 S. Ct. 2079 (2009) 
(No. 07-1529), 2009 U.S. Trans. LEXIS 5, at *26.  But see Transcript of Oral Argument 
at 36, Montejo, 129 S. Ct. 2079 (2009) (No. 07-1529), 2009 U.S. Trans. LEXIS 5, at *36 
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of the Right to Counsel in Criminal Proceedings, 66 S.C. L. REV. 867, 883 (2010). 
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respect to his Sixth Amendment rights, would not be perfectly amenable 
to speaking with the police without having counsel present. And no 
reason exists to prohibit the police from inquiring.”203 
2. Powell 
In Powell, the Court was presented with a suspect who had ten prior 
felony convictions.204  The subjective knowledge of a defendant seems to 
also be behind this decision, even if not stated explicitly.  During oral 
argument, Justice Scalia pointedly questioned the defendant’s attorney 
about whether his client actually was confused by the warning 
provided.205  He asked: 
This is angels dancing on the head of a pin. You want us to 
believe that your client, who decided to talk, even though he was 
told he could consult an attorney before any question was asked, 
and he could consult an attorney at any time during the interview, 
and he went ahead and—and confessed—you are saying, oh, if 
he had only known. Oh, if I knew that I could have an attorney 
present during the interview, well, that would have been a 
different kettle of fish and I would never have confessed.  I mean, 
doesn’t that seem to you quite fantastic?206 
The record before the Court, in fact, suggested that the defendant was 
well aware of his rights when he executed the improper waiver. 
In a footnote, the Court indicated that the defendant had actual 
knowledge that he could have an attorney present during questioning.207  
However, the Court said that this fact “does not bear on our 
conclusion.”208  Thus, while the Court was not backing away from the 
need for adequate warnings, the Court refused to allow possible 
ambiguity to trump actual knowledge. 
3. Shatzer 
In Shatzer, the prior experience of the defendant with interrogations 
was a significant factor in finding that the Edwards prohibition on 
police-initiated interrogations after a suspect requested the presence of 
                                                                                                             
 203 Montejo, 129 S. Ct. at 2086–87 (emphasis added and omitted). 
 204 Brief for Petitioner at 4, Florida v. Powell, 130 S. Ct. 1195 (2010) (No. 08-1175), 
2008 U.S. Briefs 1175, at *4. 
 205 Transcript of Oral Argument at 34, Powell, 130 S. Ct. 1195 (2010) (No. 08-1175), 
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counsel could be limited to fourteen days.209  Justice Ginsburg, during 
oral arguments, noted that this past experience was relevant to whether a 
suspect would understand that he could exercise his right to counsel.210  
She asked counsel for the defendant: 
Why wouldn’t he think, I invoked my right to remain silent 
without a lawyer two years and seven months ago, I will do it 
again; they will have to stop questioning? Why wouldn’t that be 
the most likely mindset of the defendant?  He knew that it 
worked the first time.211 
The Shatzer Court noted that a defendant “knows from his prior 
experience that he need only demand counsel to bring the interrogation 
to a halt, and that investigative custody does not last indefinitely.”212  The 
Court suggested that it is possible a suspect could determine, based on 
his experiences “and further deliberation in a familiar setting . . . that 
cooperating with the investigation is in his interest.”213  Moreover, in 
weighing the costs and benefits of extending the Edwards rule, the court 
considered the effects of this extension “[i]n a country that harbors a 
large number of repeat offenders.”214  To support this observation, the 
Court noted that, in a recent Department of Justice study, 67.5% of 
released prisoners were re-arrested within three years.215 
4. Thompkins 
In Thompkins, the precise criminal record of the defendant was not 
specified in either the Supreme Court or the state court decisions.  
However, the defendant had at least one prior felony conviction, as 
evidenced by his conviction for being a felon in possession of a gun, in 
addition to the murder conviction.216  He also appeared to be experienced 
with and unintimidated by the legal system; when he was arrested, he 
initially fled from the police, then provided a false name and false 
identification.217 
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The unambiguous statement requirement in Thompkins is a shift of 
responsibility from law enforcement to the suspect.  The Court 
concluded that the statement given by the defendant was the result of a 
knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver based on a lack of evidence of 
failure of the police to provide a Miranda warning, explicit invocation of 
Miranda rights, or coercion.218  The Court states its conclusion in the 
negative: 
The record in this case shows that [the defendant] waived his 
right to remain silent.  There is no basis to conclude that he did 
not understand his rights, and on these facts it follows that he 
chose not to invoke or rely on those rights when he did speak.219 
Later in the opinion, the Court provided a list of reasons why a suspect 
might rationally decide to waive their Miranda rights and speak to the 
police.220  The Court suggested that a suspect may gain “additional 
information” to aid in the decision.221  The Court continued: 
When the suspect knows that Miranda rights can be invoked at 
any time, he or she has the opportunity to reassess his or her 
immediate and long-term interests.  Cooperation with the police 
may result in more favorable treatment for the suspect, the 
apprehension of accomplices, the prevention of continuing injury 
and fear, beginning steps towards relief or solace for the victims; 
and the beginning of the suspect’s own return to the law and 
social order it seeks to protect.222 
The Thompkins Court thus signaled that an implied waiver of Miranda 
rights is sufficient.  In other words, the law does not require an express 
waiver of Miranda rights.  The result is that criminal defendants are 
required to take the initiative to invoke, expressly and unambiguously, 
their Miranda rights following their advisement of those rights. 
                                                                                                             
 218 Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. at 2263. 
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B. Consideration of Criminal Background by State and Lower Federal 
Courts 
The consideration of the criminal history and background of 
defendants in Miranda cases is not new or unique.  The United States 
Supreme Court has not explicitly considered this factor in determining 
whether a waiver was voluntary, however, it is implicit in another 
decision.  In Fare v. Michael C., the Supreme Court considered an 
argument by a juvenile that he had been unable to understand his 
rights.223  The Court, in rejecting this argument, noted that the juvenile 
had “considerable experience with the police” and that he had “a record 
of several arrests,” had served time in a “youth camp,” and was on 
probation.224 
More explicit examples are found in the lower courts.  One example 
is the recent Sixth Circuit decision in Simpson v. Jackson.225  In Simpson, 
the defendant was under investigation for aiding and abetting an arson—
through the use of a Molotov cocktail—which led to the death of a child 
and injuries to numerous other persons.226   The defendant challenged the 
use of four statements he gave to the police.227  One of the statements 
was made to a Columbus Police Department homicide detective and a 
federal special agent while the defendant was in prison on an unrelated 
charge.228  The interview was held in a conference room in the warden’s 
office after the defendant was pulled from general population.229 
After a second statement at the prison (this time, in the infirmary), 
the law enforcement officers arranged the release of the defendant on 
probation so that he would cooperate with the investigation.230  However, 
the defendant failed to cooperate and to abide by the terms of his 
probation.231   He was arrested and interrogated at police headquarters.232  
Prior to the interview, the defendant was given his Miranda rights.233  He 
subsequently admitted his involvement in starting the fire.234 
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When the defendant was asked whether he was willing to speak 
with the officers after receiving his Miranda rights, he responded: 
(1) “mmm-mmmm,” clearly in a negative way; (2) a sideways 
shake of his hand and a slight shake of his head; (3) mumbling 
something and then saying “nah” or “naw”; and (4) then saying 
“I messed up last time I did that.” The officer then replied, “So 
you don’t want to talk to us? You do or you don’t want to talk to 
us?” [the defendant] responded with more  negative body 
language and said, “I mean, it can’t help.” Following four to five 
seconds of silence, the officer said, “Well that’s up to you, 
whether you want to talk to us or not, we’re not going to twist 
your arm or anything like that.” [the defendant] immediately 
responded, “what y’all wanna talk about?” and the officer stated, 
“just basically what we’re talking about now.”235 
The defendant then started to question the officer about the details of his 
current arrest; the officer did not ask any questions.236  Another officer 
then asked the defendant, “so do you want to talk to us about any of this 
or not?”237  The defendant mumbled an intelligible response and was 
handed a written Miranda waiver form.238  The defendant said, “I mean, 
this right here, it really don’t make no difference, you know what I’m 
saying, sign it or not.”239 
The defendant in Simpson challenged the voluntariness of his 
waiver, arguing that the officers “used a combination of threats and 
promises, which had the cumulative effect of overbearing his will.”240  
The Sixth Circuit rejected this argument.241  The court considered the fact 
that the defendant was “familiar with the officers.”242  The court noted 
that “it is clear that [the defendant] had extensive experience with the 
criminal justice system.”243  Accordingly, “the experience of being 
questioned by the police was neither new nor novel to him.”244 
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In another case, the Eighth Circuit considered the defendant’s 
criminal history as a factor in determining whether a lengthy 
interrogation rendered a waiver of Miranda rights involuntary.  In 
Williams v. Norris,245 the defendant was a suspect in the disappearance of 
a woman in Little Rock.  He was arrested on an outstanding warrant, 
waived his Miranda rights, and during a thirteen-hour interview 
confessed to kidnapping the woman.246    The defendant argued that his 
waiver of his Miranda rights was involuntary because, during the 
“marathon interrogation” in a “cramped room” he was subjected to 
coercive tactics, including appeals to God and sympathy for the victim’s 
family.247  In rejecting this argument, the Eighth Circuit noted that the 
defendant was “relatively well educated and experienced with the 
criminal justice system.”248 
State courts interpreting the voluntariness of a confession have been 
more explicit than the federal courts in including criminal background 
among the factors to be considered in determining voluntariness.  The 
Minnesota Supreme Court has explicitly considered the importance of a 
suspect’s familiarity with the criminal justice system.249  The court 
stated, “[i]n assessing voluntariness, this court has focused heavily on 
both a defendant’s education and his familiarity with the criminal justice 
system.  We have found significant in previous cases that the defendant 
had been read his Miranda rights before the investigation at issue.”250  
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has been suppressed as coercive for this reason.  Cf. Davis v. State of North Carolina, 339 
F.2d 770, 776 (4th Cir. 1964) (prayer by officer seeking God’s blessing not coercive); 
Skaggs v. Parker, 27 F.Supp.2d 952, 974 (W.D. Ky. 1998) (finding “insufficient 
evidence” that religious discussion was coercive).  Supreme Court precedents are not to 
the contrary.  See Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 169 (1986) (Miranda waiver not 
involuntary where psychiatrist testified that defendant believed God had told him to 
confess); Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 407 (1977) (“Christian burial” speech 
violated right to counsel, not voluntary nature of confession).  See also supra note 181–
82 and accompanying text (discussing interview with suspect in Berghuis v. Thompkins, 
130 S. Ct. 2250 (2010), wherein detectives asked the suspect whether he “believed in 
God”). 
 248 Williams, 576 F.3d at 869.  See also Treesh v. Bagley, 612 F.3d 424, 434 (6th Cir. 
2010) (“In further support of the conclusion that [the defendant] made a knowing and 
intelligent waiver of his rights . . . . [He] testified that he was familiar with the criminal 
justice system.”); United States v. Doe, 226 F.3d 672, 680 (6th Cir. 2000) (finding that a 
waiver was valid in part because of the defendant’s substantial history with the justice 
system). 
 249 State v. Miller, 573 N.W.2d 661, 672 (Minn. 1998). 
 250 Id. (citations omitted). 
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The Colorado Supreme Court has also explicitly provided that “the 
background and experience of the defendant in connection with the 
criminal justice system” is a factor to be considered in determining 
whether a waiver is voluntary.251  And the Iowa Supreme Court has held 
that a court should rely upon a wide range of factors in determining 
whether a defendant’s waiver of rights was voluntary, including “a 
defendant’s prior experience in the criminal justice system.”252 
Even in situations where defendants have more limited mental 
capabilities, some courts have held that prior experience with the 
criminal justice system can be a significant factor in finding that 
defendants voluntarily waived their Miranda rights.  For example, in 
United States v. Rojas-Tapia,253 the defendant was arrested on suspicion 
of being involved in a plan to hijack a helicopter, and then use the 
helicopter to stage a prison escape in Puerto Rico.254   During the 
booking process, and after receiving his Miranda warnings, the 
defendant stated that he wanted to tell the law enforcement officers about 
his participation in the hijacking.255  The officers repeated the Miranda 
warning, and the defendant proceeded to make a detailed confession.256  
The defendant later sought to suppress the statements on the grounds that 
a report indicated he had a significantly below average IQ.257  The First 
Circuit rejected this argument, in part because of the defendant’s 
extensive criminal history.258  The court described that defendant as 
“hardly a neophyte in the criminal justice system,” noting his “extensive 
prior record.”259  The court, thus, concluded that “whatever the 
deficiencies in his intellectual functioning, [the defendant’s] repeated 
earlier exposure to Miranda warnings made it extremely unlikely that he 
failed to understand his rights at the time he made these incriminating 
statements.”260 
                                                                                                             
 251 People v. Hopkins, 774 P.2d 849, 852 (Colo. 1989). 
 252 State v. Payton, 481 N.W.2d 325, 329 (Iowa 1992). 
 253 446 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2006). 
 254 Id. at 2. 
 255 Id. at 2–3. 
 256 Id. 
 257 Id. at 7. 
 258 Id. at 8. 
 259 Rojas-Tapia, 446 F.3d at 8. 
 260 Id.  (citing United States v. Glover, 431 F.3d 744, 748 (11th Cir. 2005); United 
States v. Pruden, 398 F.3d 241, 246 (3d Cir. 2005); Taylor v. Maddox, 366 F.3d 992, 
1015 (9th Cir. 2004); United States v. Morris, 247 F.3d 1080, 1090 (10th Cir. 2001); 
United States v. Palmer, 203 F.3d 55, 61 (1st Cir. 2000); Correll v. Thompson, 63 F.3d 
1279, 1288 (4th Cir. 1995)).  A similar standard has been applied to juvenile suspects.  
See United States v. Kerr, 120 F.3d 239, 241 (11th Cir. 1997) (in evaluating voluntary 
nature of statement by juvenile, noting that juvenile “had a substantial history of 
involvement in the Juvenile Justice System and, in fact, was a runaway from a state 
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Other courts have relied upon the prior criminal justice system 
experience of defendants to overcome concerns stemming from below 
average intelligence.  In United States v. Jones,261 the court found that a 
defendant with only an eighth grade education and “below average 
intelligence” could voluntarily waive his Miranda rights based, in part on 
his “considerable previous experience with the criminal justice 
system.”262  Similarly, in United States v. Conner,263 the court rejected an 
effort by a defendant with a 71 IQ to have his post-Miranda confession 
found to be involuntary.264  The court said, 
It should be noted that this particular Defendant has been arrested 
on a number of occasions. Therefore, the 37-year old Defendant 
is experienced and familiar with routine police policy such as 
being read his Miranda rights, being hand-cuffed, and being 
transported to jail, perhaps for additional questioning.265 
Finally, in Poyner v. Murray,266 the Fourth Circuit rejected a claim that a 
waiver by a suspect with an IQ between 79 and 85 was involuntary 
where the suspect with twelve prior convictions  “was no stranger to the 
criminal justice system.”267  The Poyner court explained that the 
suspect’s “background provided him with at least some familiarity with 
his rights and with the process to which he would be subjected.”268 
V. IMPLICATIONS OF INCREASED EMPHASIS ON THE CRIMINAL 
RECORDS OF DEFENDANTS IN ASSESSING MIRANDA WAIVERS 
Courts’ increased consideration of the criminal background of 
suspects, whether implicit by the Supreme Court or explicit by state and 
lower federal courts, in determining whether a Miranda waiver is made 
voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently has several implications for the 
                                                                                                             
facility.”); In re Richard UU, 870 N.Y.S.2d 472, 476–77 (N.Y. App. Div. 2008) 
(voluntary confession by 14-year-old who “had prior experience with law enforcement 
and was aware of the significance of his Miranda rights”). 
 261 No. 1:09-cr-00110, 2010 WL 1628049 (N.D. Ohio Apr. 7, 2010). 
 262 Id., at *18. 
 263 No. 8:06-cr-342-T-30TGW, 2007 WL 1428923 (M.D. Fla. May 14, 2007). 
 264 Id. at *1. 
 265 Id.  But see Commonwealth v. Boyarsky, 897 N.E. 2d 574, 585 (Mass. 2008) 
(defendant’s mental disorder and previous inexperience with justice system insufficient to 
raise doubt about voluntariness of confession). 
 266 964 F.2d 1404 (4th Cir. 1992). 
 267 Id. at 1413–14. 
 268 Id. at 1414.  See also United States v. Robinson, 404 F.3d 850, 861 (4th Cir. 2005) 
(waiver by a defendant with a below average IQ valid where the suspect had waived his 
rights on two prior occasions).  But see Boyarsky, 897 N.E. 2d at 585 (defendant’s mental 
disorder and previous inexperience with justice system insufficient to raise doubt about 
voluntariness of confession). 
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future of the Miranda doctrine.269  In terms of individual cases, as the 
Court begins to more explicitly take into account the criminal history of 
suspects, the government will find it easier to make the necessary 
showing to overcome the presumption against waiver.  A suspect who is 
familiar with the criminal justice system, Miranda warnings, and police 
tactics is—it appears in the view of many courts—more likely to make 
an uncoerced choice to waive Miranda rights because the suspect is more 
likely to have the requisite level of comprehension. 
In more general terms, I foresee two broader implications from the 
greater consideration of the criminal background of suspects in 
evaluating Miranda waivers.  First, an increased focus on the subjective 
knowledge of suspects signals a shift away from the Court’s traditional 
Miranda focus on preventing abusive police practices.  In the original 
Miranda decision, the Court focused on “interrogation practices which 
are likely to exert such pressure upon an individual as to disable him 
from making a free and rational choice.”270 Later, the Court in Dickerson 
v. United States was more explicit in recognizing that “the coercion 
inherent in custodial interrogation blurs the line between voluntary and 
involuntary statements.”271  Recent decisions expounding on Miranda 
have maintained the view that Miranda is aimed at curbing abusive 
police practices.  In Thompkins, for example, the Court examined 
whether there was evidence that the defendant’s statement was 
coerced.272  And in Montejo and Shatzer, the Court emphasized that the 
Edwards rule was a judicially-created rule designed to prevent badgering 
or coercion by the police.273 
The focus on the criminal background of a defendant presents a 
subtle shift in approach.  Instead of relying on a prophylactic rule to 
prevent abusive police tactics, the Court is starting to focus instead on 
whether a particular defendant was coerced by the tactics used by the 
police.  In this manner, the Court is able to maintain that the failure to 
give the prescribed warnings and obtain a waiver of rights before 
custodial questioning requires exclusion of any statements obtained.  
However, in the absence of a direct failure of the police to provide a 
necessary Miranda warning, the exclusion of statements under the 
Miranda doctrine rule will be required in fewer and fewer cases. 
                                                                                                             
 269 See supra notes 86-94 and accompanying text. 
 270 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 464–65 (1966).  See also Chavez v. Martinez, 
538 U.S. 760, 790 (2003) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
(Miranda was intended to “reduce the risk of a coerced confession”). 
 271 530 U.S. 428, 435 (2000). 
 272 Berghuis v. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. 2250, 2263 (2010). 
 273 Maryland v. Shatzer, 130 S. Ct 1213, 1230 (2010); Montejo v. Louisiana, 129 S. 
Ct. 2079, 2089 (2009). 
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This focus on the criminal background of defendants is significant 
because a court is less likely to find that a suspect with extensive 
experience with the police and Miranda warnings has made an 
involuntary statement after receiving warnings.274  The practical 
implications of this shift include a willingness to allow greater leeway to 
police and greater use of aggressive police tactics when dealing with 
suspects with criminal experience.  In addition, as demonstrated by 
Thompkins, the Court seems more likely to infer a waiver of Miranda 
rights from the silence of suspects with criminal experience.  If the rule 
that a waiver cannot be inferred from silence is maintained, the police 
will be required to make a lesser showing in order to prove that the 
almost-silent suspect had made a knowing and intelligent waiver. 
Second, while it seems unlikely that Miranda will be directly 
overruled, recent decisions and an increased focus on the criminal 
background of suspects, suggest that the Miranda rules will be subtly 
abandoned in favor of a more subjective test focusing on whether a 
statement is the result of coercion.  Indeed, some observers have 
suggested that Miranda has already been indirectly overruled.  For 
example, Professor Friedman’s article suggests that Miranda has been 
the subject of “stealth” over-ruling.275  Professor Friedman went further, 
in an article on Slate.com, suggesting that the Court is intentionally 
choosing cases with suspects possessing unsympathetic facts or histories: 
Whittle and chip away at the rule any way he can, all the while 
denying that the rule itself is in jeopardy. But to do their 
whittling without getting caught, the Roberts Court has been 
brilliant at stacking the deck—choosing to hear only Miranda 
cases in which what the police did is so sympathetic, or what the 
suspect did so awful, it’s impossible to side with the suspect. 
Then, while you’re rooting against the suspect, they’re getting rid 
of the rule that you thought you liked.276 
While, of course, it is impossible to know the motives of the Justices, 
Friedman may be overstating the Court’s intention.  The question of 
whether Miranda rights have been knowingly and voluntarily waived has 
                                                                                                             
 274 See Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 433 n.20 (1984) (noting that cases “in 
which a defendant can make a colorable argument that a self-incriminating statement was 
‘compelled’ despite the fact that the law enforcement authorities adhered to the dictates 
of Miranda are rare”). 
 275 Barry Friedman, The Wages of Stealth Overruling (with Particular Attention to 
Miranda v. Arizona) (Jul. 1, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
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 276 Barry Friedman and Dahlia Lithwick, Watch as We Make This Law Disappear. 
How the Roberts Court Disguises its Conservatism, SLATE (Oct. 4, 2010, 6:41 AM), 
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always been determined on the particular facts and circumstances 
surrounding the case before the Court, including the background, 
experience, and conduct of the suspect.277  This approach may be the best 
reading of Montejo, Powell, Shatzer, and Thompkins.  In all four cases, 
suspects with experience dealing with law enforcement were voluntarily, 
knowingly, and intelligently willing to engage in conversations with the 
police.278 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The four Miranda cases decided by the Supreme Court between 
May 2009 and the end of the October 2009 term, Montejo, Powell, 
Shatzer, and Thompkins all featured suspects who could fairly be 
described as frequent fliers.  In these four cases, the Court has begun to 
lose sight of Miranda’s original purpose—limiting the coercive 
atmosphere of custodial interrogations.  Instead, the Court has begun a 
subtle shift towards focusing more responsibility of the subjective 
knowledge of suspects rather than the objective actions and tactics of the 
police. 
In particular, the Court has started to implicitly consider the 
criminal background of suspects among the factors to be considered in 
determining whether a Miranda waiver and subsequent statement is 
knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.  By implicitly—and, someday, 
probably, explicitly—taking the criminal experience of the suspect into 
account along with the totality of the circumstances surrounding the 
interrogation, the Court may be engaging in a more realistic review into 
whether a waiver and statement were uncoerced. 
 
                                                                                                             
 277 North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 374–75 (1979) (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 
304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938)). 
 278 Viewed in hindsight, these may not have been the wisest decisions.  Yet all four 
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